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WHERE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
CONFLICT* 
Dealing with Legislative Gaps (and Non-gaps) in Singapore 
This article is concerned with the resolution of legislative 
gaps in Singapore. Legislative gaps can arise obviously, 
such as when the draftsman mistakenly omitted an obvious 
word in a legislative provision. Gaps can also arise more 
ambiguously, such as where an old statute has not kept pace 
with modern development, thereby leaving a gap between the 
statute’s broad objects and particular application. Beyond the 
presence of gaps, the courts also have to consider how much 
weight, if at all, is to be placed on the absence of gaps. This 
article will propose a framework for dealing with legislative 
gaps (and non-gaps) in the local context. 
GOH Yihan 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);  
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 According to Aristotle, when a case arises that is not covered by 
the law due to the legislator’s oversimplification, then it is right to 
“correct the omission – to say what the legislator himself would have 
said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had 
known”.1 However, just when and to what extent the courts can do this 
remains unclear. Today, the courts still have to deal with whether they 
have the power to fill in legislative gaps. The correct approach to take, as 
Coxon points out, is perhaps made more complicated due to the 
separation of powers and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.2 
Apart from legislative gaps, courts also have to deal with the situation 
where Parliament has intentionally not left a gap but it is unclear if that 
was intended to preclude judicial intervention. The Singapore courts are 
                                                          
* This research was supported in the Singapore Management University by the 
Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 1 Grant (14-C234-
SMU-022). The author would like to thank Clarice Ting for very able and thorough 
editing. 
1 Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle: Oxford Edition (J A Smith & William D Ross eds) 
(Catholic Way Publishing, 2015) at p 159. 
2 Benedict Coxon, “Open to Interpretation: The Implication of Words into Statutes” 
(2009) 30 Stat L Rev 1. 
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not spared from these difficulties. Indeed, with the proliferation of 
legislation in Singapore, the courts increasingly not only have to deal 
with legislative gaps, but also with when Parliament has deliberately not 
left a gap. 
2 This article is concerned with the resolution of legislative gaps 
and related issues in Singapore. As will be seen below,3 such gaps can 
arise obviously, such as when the draftsman mistakenly omitted an 
obvious word in a legislative provision. Gaps can also arise less 
obviously, such as where an old statute has not kept pace with modern 
development, thereby leaving a gap between the statute’s broad objects 
and particular application. When can the courts fill in these legislative 
gaps, if at all? Beyond the presence of gaps, the courts also have to 
consider how much weight, if at all, is to be placed on the absence of 
gaps. For example, does the fact that Parliament has dealt with a broad 
area in a statute preclude a court from developing the common law in 
that area? 
3 In dealing with these questions, this article will first outline the 
problem of there being no clear framework for dealing with legislative 
gaps in Singapore. It will then examine the current approaches towards 
legislative gaps. It will be seen that these approaches miss the real  
issue of the proper relationship between the legislative and judicial 
power in discerning the legislative intent behind gaps. Next, in 
proposing a suitable framework for dealing with legislative gaps, it will 
set out the relevant background, that is, the rise of legislative rule in 
Singapore concurrently with a robust development of the common law. 
With this background in mind, this article will identify several guiding 
norms that can be used to guide the courts’ approaches towards 
resolving legislative gaps. 
II. The problem and present approaches 
A. The problem 
4 The problem with legislative gaps in Singapore is best illustrated 
by the High Court decision of AXA Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd v 
Chandran s/o Natesan4 (“AXA Insurance”). In AXA Insurance, the 
plaintiff insurance company sued the defendant in the tort of 
harassment for persistently sending e-mails and phone calls to its 
employees and lawyers using vulgar and threatening language. The High 
Court rejected the plaintiff ’s contention, inter alia, because it doubted 
                                                          
3 See paras 10–12 below. 
4 [2013] 4 SLR 545. 
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that there was a tort of harassment in Singapore. It held that since 
Parliament had (at the time) criminalised harassment under ss 13A  
and 13B of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) 
Act5 (“MOA”), it should be up to Parliament to determine whether the 
law should govern annoyance caused by means of letters, e-mails and 
telephone messages, and whether the present public order law ought to 
be expanded to allow a claim for civil remedies.6 The court was 
fundamentally concerned that the court, which is not accountable in the 
way Parliament was to the electorate, should be restrained in the law-
making process.7 Since the tort of harassment was essentially a new tort, 
the court felt that Parliament should be the body to create it through a 
process of deliberation and debate. The court was also concerned that it 
would be impossible to formulate a definition for the tort of harassment 
that is sufficiently certain. If the courts were to proceed with a vague 
definition of harassment, the court was concerned that it would result in 
the creation of a “blockbuster tort”, which might then be used by all 
manners of persons for apparently minor acts of nuisance.8 
5 It is respectfully submitted that the High Court in AXA 
Insurance adopted a far too restrictive view of the judicial law-making 
process. First of all, as acknowledged by the Court of Appeal, it is now 
widely accepted that the common law courts do make law.9 Law-making 
is not the exclusive domain of Parliament. In fact, even Parliament has 
acknowledged the existence of the tort of harassment made at common 
law, thereby acknowledging the courts’ law-making powers. In his 
response speech at the Committee of Supply Debate on the Ministry of 
Home Affairs in 2004, Assoc Prof Ho Peng Kee acknowledged that the 
tort of harassment exists in Singapore. He had said this in the context of 
addressing protection against harassment in Singapore.10 He regarded 
the tort of harassment as part of the protection against harassment that 
gave the victim civil remedies by way of an injunction or damages. 
Therefore, had Parliament thought that civil remedies for harassment 
were within its exclusive domain, it is conceivable that it would have 
acted to legislatively overrule Malcomson Nicholas Hugh Bertram v 
                                                          
5 Cap 184, 1997 Rev Ed. Sections 13A and 13B have since been repealed with the 
enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 (Act 17 of 2014). 
6 AXA Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd v Chandran s/o Natesan [2013] 4 SLR 545 at [8]. 
7 AXA Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd v Chandran s/o Natesan [2013] 4 SLR 545 at [9]. 
8 AXA Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd v Chandran s/o Natesan [2013] 4 SLR 545 at [10]. 
9 Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [241], rejecting the 
declaratory theory of the common law and acknowledging that judges do make 
law. 
10 Ministry of Home Affairs, “Response Given by the Senior Minister of State for 
Home Affairs and Law, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee at the Committee of 
Supply Debate on the Ministry of Home Affairs” (Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, Official Report (12 March 2004) vol 77 at col 1368). 
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Naresh Kumar Mehta11 (“Malcomson”), especially since it had this 
knowledge since at least 2004. Yet, on the contrary, it regarded 
Malcomson as forming one of the many levels of protection against 
harassment in 2004. 
6 More broadly, if one were to take the High Court’s reasoning in 
AXA Insurance to its logical conclusion, then it would render the courts 
almost powerless in the face of changed societal conditions. As 
mentioned, the court’s primary concern was that it did not infringe on 
Parliament’s domain since Parliament had considered harassment in the 
criminal sphere. This concern is borne out by the court’s holding that, 
since Parliament had criminalised harassment under ss 13A and 13B of 
the MOA, it should be up to Parliament to determine whether the law 
should govern harassment in the civil sphere. This means that whenever 
Parliament has considered an issue, the courts will be powerless to rule 
on that issue. Given that Parliament has obviously considered many 
issues to varying degrees in its legislative capacity, the reasoning in AXA 
Insurance means that the courts cannot consider any issue because 
everything has been considered by Parliament. This cannot be right. 
7 The High Court’s approach in AXA Insurance shows that a  
more calibrated approach towards legislative gaps (and correspondingly, 
non-gaps) should be formulated. AXA Insurance concerned an instance 
of legislative non-gap and, to be fair, there may be situations where the 
courts should not intervene in what Parliament has legislated for. 
However, as AXA Insurance shows, the dividing line between what is 
permissible and impermissible may not be all too clear. It is certainly 
unsatisfactory that the courts refuse to decide on an issue simply 
because Parliament has considered it in the broadest of fashions. The 
situation becomes even more unclear when one considers what 
Parliament meant by gaps in the legislation. The question is thus how 
the courts should deal with this problem. 
B. Existing approaches 
8 The existing approaches towards legislative gaps and non-gaps 
are to treat them as an issue of either statutory interpretation or whether 
the common law has been ousted by legislation. While similar, the 
existing approaches show an almost ritualistic formula that, it will be 
suggested below,12 misses the main question that should be answered. 
                                                          
11 [2001] 3 SLR(R) 379. 
12 See paras 31–33 below. 
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(1) Question of statutory interpretation 
9 When there is a legislative gap, the current approach is to 
discern how the gap came about and then deal with it using established 
solutions. In this regard, Auchie identifies three situations in which 
legislative gaps may arise, namely, due to an obvious drafting mistake; 
the drafter failing to foresee a specific situation; and the legislation being 
unintelligible.13 
(a) Legislative gap due to obvious drafting mistake 
10 The first of these situations is the most obvious and is typically 
referred to as a casus omissus. The full maxim dealing with such 
legislative gaps is casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which means 
that a case omitted is to be regarded as intentionally omitted.14 The 
absolute rule against filling gaps has been gradually relaxed by the 
courts over time. In the House of Lords decision of Wentworth Securities 
Ltd v Jones15 (“Wentworth”), Lord Diplock laid down three conditions to 
be satisfied before the courts can read words into statutes, thereby filling 
a casus omissus. The conditions would be satisfied if:16 
First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the 
provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was 
that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent 
that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, 
and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt 
with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was 
possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that 
would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by 
Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the 
Bill was passed into law. 
Lord Diplock added a further cautionary note when he said that unless 
the third condition is satisfied, any attempt at filling in the omission 
“crosses the boundary between construction and legislation” and usurps 
a function that “is vested in the legislature to the exclusion of the 
courts”.17 However, Lord Diplock’s third condition, that requiring 
knowledge of the exact words that Parliament would have used, 
rendered the courts’ power to fill a casus omissus almost impossible. 
                                                          
13 Derek Auchie, “The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule” (2004) 25 Stat 
L Rev 40. 
14 John Trayner, Latin Maxims and Phrases (William Green & Sons, 4th Ed, 1894) 
at p 71. 
15 [1980] AC 74. 
16 Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74 at 105. 
17 Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74 at 105–106. 
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11 Lord Diplock’s conditions have since been refined by the House 
of Lords decision of Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution18 
(“Inco”). In Inco, Lord Nicholls confirmed that the courts’ role in 
statutory interpretation is not confined to resolving ambiguities but 
may also extend to correcting obvious drafting errors, which may 
involve the addition, omission or substitution of words. With regard to 
Lord Diplock’s three conditions in Wentworth, Lord Nicholls said this:19 
So the courts exercise considerable caution before adding or omitting 
or substituting words. Before interpreting a statute in this way the 
court must be abundantly sure of three matters: (1) the intended 
purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence 
the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in 
the provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision 
Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise 
words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been 
noticed. … 
Sometimes, even when these conditions are met, the court may find 
itself inhibited from interpreting the statutory provision in accordance 
with what it is satisfied was the underlying intention of Parliament. 
The alteration in language may be too far-reaching. In Western Bank 
Ltd v Schindler, Scarman LJ observed that the insertion must not be 
too big, or too much at variance with the language used by the 
legislature. Or the subject matter may call for a strict interpretation of 
the statutory language, as in penal legislation. 
12 According to Coxon, Lord Nicholls’ speech made two important 
clarifications to Lord Diplock’s conditions in Wentworth.20 First, in so far 
as the third condition is concerned, it is no longer a requirement that 
the exact additional words that Parliament would have used be 
ascertainable; it is sufficient that the substance of those words be 
obvious. This importantly makes filling a casus omissus more plausible. 
Secondly, a fourth condition was added, in that the additional words 
must not be too different from the language used by Parliament in the 
existing legislation. This therefore places a textual constraint on the 
words that courts use to fill in a legislative gap caused by an obvious 
drafting mistake. Such a requirement may already have been implicit in 
Lord Diplock’s three conditions. Lord Diplock himself was more than 
likely to have intended that the statutory words should constrain how 
courts filled a legislative gap. Indeed, in the earlier case of Duport Steels 
Ltd v Sirs,21 Lord Diplock stated that where the meaning of the statutory 
                                                          
18 [2000] 1 WLR 586. 
19 Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586 at 592. 
20 Benedict Coxon, “Open to Interpretation: The Implication of Words into Statutes” 
(2009) 30 Stat L Rev 1 at 27. 
21 [1980] 1 WLR 142. 
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words is plain and unambiguous, courts cannot invent ambiguities so as 
to escape from giving effect to the plain meaning.22 
(b) Legislative gap due to failure to foresee a specific situation 
13 A second instance of a legislative gap is when the draftsman fails 
to foresee a specific situation and does not therefore make provision for 
it. This is also known as a casus improvisus. Thus, if legislation has been 
passed to address a particular mischief and provides the situations it is 
to have effect, a situation that is omitted but yet comes within the 
targeted mischief is a casus improvisus.23 The courts will not generally 
fill a casus improvisus. In R v Peterborough City Council,24 Sir John 
Donaldson MR said that, if it is ascertained that a legislative gap is 
caused by a legislative failure to foresee the situation and not a legislative 
failure to spell out its intentions, the statutory language must be given 
effect to in accordance with their plain terms.25 This is a stricter 
approach compared to a casus omissus. This difference can be explained 
by the fact that the legislative gap in the form of a casus improvisus is 
more likely to have been intentional on part of Parliament, rather than 
inadvertent. 
14 However, mere omission in a legislation does not necessarily 
amount to a casus improvisus. It must be clear that the gap exists because 
Parliament has made no provision whatsoever for a particular situation. 
For example, in London & Clydeside v Aberdeen,26 Lord Fraser said the 
fact that Parliament has not provided for the legal consequences to 
follow from a failure to carry out a statutory procedure does not give 
rise to a casus improvisus where they can be ascertained by the common 
law.27 Similarly, under ss 3(1) and 3(2) of the Residential Property Act,28 
any transfer of any residential property to a foreign person shall be null 
and void. However, the statute is silent on the status of the purchase 
money. In such a case, there is no doubt that common law principles 
should intervene to decide how the money is to be dealt with. It would 
certainly be unworkable if the courts were to say that the common law 
has no role to play in such circumstances. The identification of a casus 
improvisus is therefore as important as knowing how to deal with it. 
                                                          
22 Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142 at 157. 
23 John Trayner, Latin Maxims and Phrases (William Green & Sons, 4th Ed, 1894) 
at p 70. 
24 (1986) 85 LGR 249. 
25 R v Peterborough City Council (1986) 85 LGR 249 at 264. 
26 London & Clydeside v Aberdeen [1980] 1 WLR 182. 
27 London & Clydeside v Aberdeen [1980] 1 WLR 182 at 195. 
28 Cap 274, 2009 Rev Ed. 
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15 In Singapore, one example of how the courts dealt with a casus 
improvisus is WX v WW29 (“WX”), which concerned the interpretation 
of s 114 of the Evidence Act30 (“EA”). The main issue in the appeal before 
the High Court was whether the appellant was the father of the child, 
which in turn was relevant in determining whether the appellant ought 
to pay maintenance for the child.31 According to the respondent, she had 
had sexual relationships with two men between 2001 and May 2005, one 
of whom was the appellant. In June 2005, the respondent discovered 
that she was pregnant. The other man, H, thought that the child was his 
and married the respondent. The child was born in January 2006. 
However, it became apparent to H that the child could not be his 
biological daughter owing to her blood group. H then had a DNA test 
done and scientifically confirmed that he was not the biological father of 
the child. H commenced nullity proceedings that eventually resulted in 
the nullification of his marriage with the respondent. The respondent 
thereafter claimed for maintenance for the child against the appellant. 
The respondent succeeded before the District Court. The court believed 
the respondent that she only ever had sexual relations with the appellant 
and H. Since the DNA test report showed that H was not the child’s 
father, the court concluded that the appellant must be the father of the 
child.32 The appellant appealed to the High Court. 
16 Before the High Court, the appellant argued that s 114 of the EA 
raised a conclusive presumption that the child was the legitimate 
daughter of H since she was born when the marriage between the 
respondent and H was still subsisting. Section 114 of the EA provides as 
follows: 
Birth during marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy 
114. The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a 
valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within 280 days 
after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be 
conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can 
be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other 
at any time when he could have been begotten. 
17 The appellant thus argued that he could not be the child’s father 
and was not liable to pay maintenance, notwithstanding the DNA test 
report that showed that H was not the biological father of the child. 
Faced with the DNA test report, the court understandably thought that 
the appellant’s argument “offend[ed] both justice and commonsense”33 
                                                          
29 [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573. 
30 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed. 
31 Pursuant to s 69(2) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed). 
32 WW v WX [2008] SGDC 93 at [8]–[13]. 
33 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [6]. 
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and that upholding the appellant’s position would mean that “the law 
would hold that H is the father of the child even though the science has 
shown otherwise”.34 The court therefore found the appellant to be the 
biological father of the child and upheld the lower court’s decision 
ordering him to maintain the child. 
18 The court was cognisant of s 114 of the EA. It, however, decided 
that s 114 was concerned only with the issue of legitimacy and not 
paternity.35 The court gave two reasons for this conclusion. First, s 114 
of the EA does not expressly provide for a presumption of paternity in 
the same way it provides for a presumption of legitimacy.36 Secondly, 
the presumption of legitimacy in s 114 of the EA arises even in 
circumstances where “some person other than the husband is likely to 
be the biological father”.37 Since s 114 of the EA was concerned with the 
issue of legitimacy and the protection of a child as such, the court 
thought that it would be wrong to interpret s 114 to deny protection to a 
child in terms of maintenance by the biological father.38 For these 
reasons, the court concluded that s 114 of the EA only concerned the 
conferment of legitimacy “in the circumstances set out in the provision 
and not to rebut or invalidate evidence that a man is the biological 
father of a child”.39 
19 As a secondary ground for its decision, the court pointed out 
that ss 68 and 69 of the Women’s Charter40 (“the Charter”) establishes a 
legal duty on the part of the parent to contribute to the maintenance of 
his children whether they are his legitimate children or not.41 This 
meant that because the DNA test report showed the appellant to be the 
biological father of the child, he was liable for her maintenance under 
those provisions. Whether the child was the appellant’s legitimate or 
illegitimate child did not matter. While the court said that this 
conclusion was independent of its interpretation of s 114 of the EA,42 
                                                          
34 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [6]. 
35 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [11]. See also AAE v AAF [2009] 3 SLR(R) 827 
at [25], where the High Court understood the court in WX v WW to have: 
… reasoned that the presumption of legitimacy in s 114 [of the Evidence Act 
(Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed)] is confined to the status of the child alone; paternity of 
itself – whether the child is an issue of the husband – is a different matter and 
falls outside the provision. 
36 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [11]. 
37 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [12]. 
38 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [14]. 
39 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [14]. 
40 Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed. 
41 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [15]. 
42 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [15]: 
Even if I were wrong in my interpretation of the scope of s 114 of the 
[Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed)], I would hold that it does not apply in 
respect of s 69(2) of the Charter … 
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it is respectfully submitted that this is not the case. A step in the reasoning 
must be that paternity can be separated from legitimacy in s 114 of the 
EA. If not, the presumption that the child is the legitimate daughter of H 
(which the court did not discount) raises the corresponding 
presumption that H is the biological father of the child, in which case 
there would be no paternity relationship between the appellant and the 
child in law, notwithstanding the scientific conclusion reached in the 
DNA test report.43 
20 Finally, the court opined that it was “difficult” to see how 
Parliament, in enacting ss 68 and 69 of the Charter more than half a 
century after s 114 of the EA was enacted, could have intended to relieve 
the duty to provide maintenance under the Charter vis-à-vis the 
biological father when the mother happened to be married to another 
man at the time of birth.44 In sum, the consequence of the court’s 
reasoning is that s 114 did not foresee the situation where there was 
DNA evidence and that this casus improvisus could be filled by the 
court. 
(c) Legislative gap due to legislation being unintelligible 
21 A legislative gap can also arise due to legislation being 
unintelligible. In such cases, the courts will try to make sense of 
provisions that are otherwise nonsensical.45 Auchie provides two 
instances of when this may occur. The first is when a court substitutes a 
word in the legislation so as to make sense of it. In R v Oakes,46 s 7 of the 
UK Official Secrets Act 192047 provides that: 
Any person who … aids or abets and does any act preparatory to the 
commission of an offence under the principal Act or this Act, shall be 
guilty of a felony … 
22 Oakes was charged with doing an act preparatory to the 
commission of a specified offence only. He thus argued that he was not 
guilty on a literal reading of s 7 since the Prosecution needed to show 
that he was also aiding or abetting the offence. Lord Parker CJ 
acknowledged this argument, but thought that would have rendered the 
section nonsensical. He held that the courts could read in or change 
                                                          
43 The starting point is s 114 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“EA”), not 
s 68 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed). In other words, a legal 
conclusion that the appellant is the biological father of the child cannot be reached 
without interpreting s 114 of the EA. 
44 WX v WW [2009] 3 SLR(R) 573 at [17]. 
45 Derek Auchie, “The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule” (2004) 25 Stat 
L Rev 40 at 43. 
46 [1959] 2 WLR 694. 
47 c 75. 
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words according to the supposed intention of Parliament where the 
literal meaning was unintelligible. According to this principle, he 
substituted the word “and” in s 7 with the word “or”. 
23 The second instance of how courts fill a legislative gap arising 
due to unintelligibility is when they adopt a strained interpretation of 
the statutory wording.48 For example, in Adler v George,49 the defendant 
argued that he did not contravene s 3 of the UK Official Secrets Act 1920 
because he was within the grounds of a prohibited area, as opposed to 
being in its vicinity, as was provided by the statute. Lord Parker CJ 
rejected this argument and held that s 3 should be read as meaning 
“in or in the vicinity of ”. As Auchie has said, this could be seen as an 
example of a strained interpretation of the expression “in the vicinity 
of ”.50 
(2) Relationship between common law and statute 
24 A similar problem arises with regard to how courts should deal 
with legislative non-gaps. The problem is that even though Parliament 
has statutorily provided for a particular issue, it may have done so 
without expressly excluding judicial consideration of that issue. In this 
case, should the courts consider themselves precluded from doing so? 
25 There are three situations where such a problem may arise. The 
first situation is the most obvious and occurs where there is an express 
or implied ouster of common law principles. The second is where 
Parliament has statutorily provided for the exact same issue that is 
presently being the court. The issue is whether the statute should be 
taken to have an exclusive regime or exist alongside the common law. 
The third situation is where Parliament has only provided for the broad 
issue without providing for the specific issue at hand. In this case, does 
the fact that Parliament has indicated that it might develop the law in a 
particular way mean that the courts should exclude themselves from 
that area of law? The current approach is to treat this as involving the 
consideration of several factors, some of which are not concerned with 
discerning the legislative intent. 
(a) Express or implied ouster of common law principles 
26 First of all, it is uncontroversial that if legislation has covered an 
area of law specifically to the exclusive of the common law, then the 
                                                          
48 Derek Auchie, “The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule” (2004) 25 Stat 
L Rev 40 at 43. 
49 [1964] 2 WLR 542. 
50 Derek Auchie, “The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule” (2004) 25 Stat 
L Rev 40 at 44. 
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legislative power will trump the judicial power. This is probably what 
the Court of Appeal had in mind in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-
General51 (“Lim Meng Suang”). In that case, the court rejected the 
appellant’s argument that the court has the duty to declare a statute 
unconstitutional – in that case, s 377A of the Penal Code52 – if its object 
is “illegitimate” based on purely extra-legal reasons.53 Lim Meng Suang is 
of course concerned with the constitutionality of legislation, but the 
more general proposition that can be drawn is that where legislation has 
covered an area of law specifically, the courts do not have the power to 
interfere. 
(b) Legislation covers area specifically but is silent on effect on 
common law 
27 The correct approach becomes more difficult where legislation 
covers an area specifically but is otherwise silent on its effect on the 
common law. A good example raised by Andrew Burrows54 is the 
House of Lords decision of Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total 
Network SL55 (“Total Network SL”). In that a case, a bare majority of the 
court decided that the Revenue and Customs commissioners could 
claim for damages arising from the tort of unlawful means conspiracy in 
respect of a Value Added Tax (“VAT”) fraud. This was notwithstanding 
the commissioners’ power provided by legislation to recover VAT. The 
question of principle considered by the court was thus whether the 
fact that Parliament provided for the specific remedy in the statute 
precluded any recourse at common law. 
28 The minority judges reasoned that the relevant statute was a 
comprehensive code and thus precluded a concurrent tort claim. In 
their words, “[t]he notion of the common law filling in the holes in a 
taxing statute … appears wrong in principle”.56 In contrast, the majority 
judges thought that there was no objection to there being a concurrent 
tort claim. Indeed, as Lord Mance pointedly stated, “the statute must be 
positively shown to be inconsistent with the continuation of the ordinary 
common law remedy otherwise available”.57 The sharp distinction 
                                                          
51 [2015] 1 SLR 26. 
52 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed. 
53 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [83]. 
54 Andrew Burrows, “The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the Law 
of Obligations” (2012) 128 LQR 232 at 238. 
55 [2008] 1 AC 1174. 
56 Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174 
at [201]. 
57 Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174 
at [130]. 
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between the two decisions reveals an inconsistent starting point in 
discerning how to treat a legislative coverage in such a situation. 
29 A local example can be seen in Law Society of Singapore v Top 
Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd58 (“Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd”). There, 
the question was whether O 59 r 3(2) of the Rules of Court59 governed 
the issue of costs with respect to proceedings under Pt VII of the Legal 
Profession Act60 (“LPA”). The Court of Appeal held that it did not. In 
its view, Pt VII of the LPA provided a comprehensive framework for 
disciplinary proceedings and an attendant cost regime. Thus, although 
the court did not say so expressly, the legislation was treated as ousting 
an alternative cost regime. This could very well have applied to oust a 
common law cost regime as well. 
(c) Legislation covers area generally but is silent on specific areas 
30 The situation where legislation covers an area of law generally 
has been discussed above. In this regard, there are of course different 
degrees of generality, and what is contemplated here does not extend 
to broad subject areas like “contract”, “tort” or “crime”, but general 
contractual issues, particular torts and specific crimes. AXA Insurance 
concerned the tort of harassment, which Parliament had legislated for 
from a criminal, not civil, perspective. The legislation therefore covered 
the area of law (here, harassment) generally, in the sense that the 
legislation was concerned with a criminal offence and not a civil action. 
The High Court held that the courts have no power to intervene in such 
cases. The substantive reasons given were that the law is so complex that 
the Judiciary could not deal with it, so far-reaching that the Judiciary 
could not control it effectively, and so socially and morally controversial 
that the Judiciary cannot deal with it. 
C. The real issue: Relationship between legislative and judicial 
power and ascertaining the legislative intent 
31 The central problem with the current approaches is that there is 
an unnecessarily sharp distinction drawn between the solutions for 
legislative gaps and non-gaps. It is of course true that each requires its 
own unique solution, but to condition the subsequent analysis 
exclusively on an initial question of whether there was a legislative gap 
or non-gap seems to obscure the real issue in such cases. And the real 
issue, it is submitted, is the proper relationship between legislative and 
judicial power. Failure to recognise this runs the risk of following 
                                                          
58 [2011] 2 SLR 1279. 
59 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed. 
60 Cap 61, 2009 Rev Ed. 
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mechanically an established set of solutions without appreciating the 
underlining reasons. 
32 Indeed, without recognising this real issue, the current 
approaches are apt to confuse and result in inconsistent answers. Such 
inconsistency can be seen, for example, in WX, where the High Court 
appeared to suggest that the courts can trump legislation where it is 
outdated. However, that broader approach is inconsistent with the 
narrower approach in AXA Insurance, where the High Court restrained 
itself from dealing with a matter that Parliament has only broadly 
touched. Even within Total Network SL, the House of Lords was split by 
the narrowest of margins on the proper approach to take in dealing with 
the effect of legislation dealing with a matter specifically. 
33 If it is accepted that the real issue is the proper relationship 
between legislative and judicial powers, then the solution to solve the 
problems occasioned by the current approaches is thus to discern the 
proper relationship between the two powers and then set out a series of 
norms to assist the courts in dealing with legislative gaps and non-gaps. 
The following parts will explain and substantiate a framework with 
those norms in mind. 
III. Suggested framework for dealing with legislative gaps and 
non-gaps 
A. Background 
(1) Legislative power as it evolved in England 
34 In order to understand the relationship between legislative and 
judicial powers as it exists in Singapore today, it is necessary to briefly 
sketch out the history of how legislation as a source of law came to be in 
the first place. That would require tracing the development of legislation 
in England itself, for that is where Singapore’s modern legal history 
started. It has been said that it is only really from the 16th century that 
legislation as it is known today came to exist in England.61 Between the 
Anglo-Saxon and the Norman periods, what may be vaguely described 
as “legislation” only declared or clarified customs rather than pronounced 
new law.62 It was only in the late 13th century that “statute” came to 
mean a form of law distinct from the common law.63 However, even 
then, there was no clear division between the judicial and legislative 
                                                          
61 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 20. 
62 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 20. 
63 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 21. 
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powers. This was because statutes, or legislation, were not all enacted 
through the same process. In fact, the king’s judges were also members 
of his council with some involvement in the drafting of legislation.64 
Thus, in Aumeye’s Case,65 when a serjeant tried to explain the second 
Statute of Westminster 128566 to the Court of Common Pleas, 
Hengham CJ, who was certainly involved in the drafting of that statute, 
said that he knew it better for he had made it. According to Plucknett, 
the practice and theory of English law at the time was that the maker of 
the statute should also be its interpreter, if necessary.67 
35 The separation between the judicial and legislative powers as 
expressed in legislation only came to be in the second half of the 
14th century.68 By the 15th century, not only had the House of 
Commons’ control over the enactment process strengthened, but it also 
began to put texts of bills into exact wording of the statutes being 
proposed.69 However, even though judges were no longer significantly 
involved in the drafting process, they still wanted a say over the validity 
of a statute.70 This followed one version of the Aristotelian argument, 
which held that a statute that yielded an outcome contrary to justice 
should be disregarded.71 In Bonham’s Case,72 Sir Edward Coke said that:73 
… when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or 
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will 
control it, and adjudge such Act to be void. 
However, such a view lost its validity in the 17th century, particularly 
following the revolution of 1688, which placed limitations on the power 
of the king and vested legislative authority in Parliament.74 By 1765 
Blackstone was able to observe that:75 
… acts of parliament contrary to reason are void. But if the parliament 
will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know 
                                                          
64 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 22. 
65 (1305) YB 33–5 Edw I, 78 at 82. 
66 c 1 (UK). 
67 Theodore F T Plucknett, Statutes and Their Interpretation in the First Half of the 
Fourteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, 1922) at p 21. 
68 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 22. 
69 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 23. 
70 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 27. 
71 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 28. 
72 (1610) 8 Co Rep 107a. 
73 Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 107a at 118a, as cited in Neil Duxbury, Elements of 
Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 29, although Duxbury also 
notes that some legal historians conclude that Coke was referring to a principle of 
statutory interpretation and not a full-scale judicial review. 
74 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 31. 
75 1 Bl Comm 91, as cited in Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) at pp 30–31. 
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of no power that can control it … for to set the judicial power above 
that of the legislature … would be subversion of all government. 
The predominant view, as Goldsworthy has noted, is that Parliament 
possessed a legally unlimited legislative authority within Britain.76 
36 Judges, now no longer really involved in the enactment of 
legislation and faced with the prevailing thought that Parliament was 
representative of the people’s will, considered themselves “less informed 
than Parliament” and “began to be reluctant to tread in political fields” 
and “to show a greater deference to Parliament than they had shown 
before”.77 It had become accepted in 19th-century Britain that courts 
cannot overrule what Parliament enacts, and that the judicial power was 
subordinate to the legislative power in so far as common law must yield 
to legislation in areas of conflict.78 This has remained the view in the 
English legal system in contemporary times; in the 1968 case of 
Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke,79 Lord Reid held that if Parliament 
chooses to do any of those things that most people, for moral, political 
or other reasons, regard as improper, the courts could not hold the Act 
of Parliament invalid.80 
37 In his important book, Duxbury cautions against treating too 
simply the subordination of the judicial power to legislative power. 
Indeed, he notes that the judges protected the common law from 
legislative intervention by creating a presumption that legislation only 
alters the common law to the extent that its words make absolutely 
clear.81 Despite being discredited by some, this presumption has stood 
the test of time and is still applied well into the late 20th century.82 This 
presumption has led Baade to question if parliamentary sovereignty is 
more apparent than real.83 
                                                          
76 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy 
(Clarendon Press, 1999) at p 233. However, there was still widespread difficulty in 
actually finding an official record of legislation until the start of the 19th century, 
when the Record Commission published the first official collection of statutes,  
viz, the Statutes of the Realm: see Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 24. 
77 Patrick S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, 1979) 
at p 384, as cited in Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) at pp 33–34. 
78 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 34. 
79 [1969] 1 AC 645. 
80 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 37. 
81 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645 at 723. 
82 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 39. 
83 Hans W Baade, “The Casus Omissus: A Pre-history of Statutory Analogy” (1994) 
20 Syracuse J Int’l L & Com 45 at 90. 
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38 What is significant for the purposes of this article is that there 
was largely a separation of the judicial and legislative powers at around 
the 19th century, when statutes were regarded as a separate source of law 
from the common law. Judges also largely regarded their domain as 
interpreting, not making, legislation. 
(2) Legislative power in colonial Singapore 
39 It is in that context that legislation in colonial Singapore will 
now be discussed. At the time of Singapore’s founding by the British in 
1819, the idea of “statutes” as a distinct source of law from the common 
law had already become established in the English legal system. 
Furthermore, there was already a distinction between the judicial and 
legislative powers in that English judges shied away from legislating, 
only interpreting and applying legislation. 
40 Indeed, well before the English common law ever reached 
Singapore,84 the first semblance of the English legal system came in the 
form of a code. After concluding a treaty with Sultan Hussein and the 
Temenggong on 6 February 1819 that allowed the British to set up a 
trading post in Singapore, Raffles formulated a code of local laws and 
regulations to govern Singapore on 1 January 1823. Two aspects of the 
British legal system were introduced by the 1823 Code, namely, the 
establishment of the procedure for the passage of laws and the 
constitution of the first courts in Singapore. 
41 The 1823 Code was followed by the Singapore and Malacca  
Act 1825,85 by which the English parliament authorised the East India 
Company to place Singapore under the administration of Prince of 
Wales’ Island (later known as Penang).86 That Act also empowered the 
Crown to issue letters patent providing for the administration of justice 
in the newly formed Straits Settlements.87 One of the most important 
was the Second Charter of Justice (“Second Charter”), dated 
27 November 1826, which established the reception of English law in 
Singapore. The Second Charter gave the Governor and Council of 
Prince of Wales’ Island a general legislative power, in addition to the 
                                                          
84 It is a well-established principle that in the case of ceded or conquered colonies, the 
existing law continued in force until changed by either Crown or Parliament: see 
Sahrip v Mitchell (1870) Leic 466, as cited in Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English 
Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 at 12. 
85 c 108. 
86 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 13. 
87 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 13. 
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limited power possessed by Prince of Wales’ Island under s 98 of the 
Indian Charter Act 181388 to issue regulations.89 
42 In 1830, the legislative power within the Straits Settlements 
evolved when it was transferred to the control of the Bengal presidency. 
Prince of Wales’ Island lost its power to issue regulations under the 
Indian Charter Act 1813.90 This power was assumed by the Governor-
General of Bengal but was highly suspect.91 In any case, whether there 
had been a problem became moot because all the Indian presidencies 
lost their power to issue regulations when the Indian Charter Act 183392 
transferred sole legislative power to the Governor-General of India in 
Council.93 In R v Burah,94 the Privy Council held that, pursuant to this 
transfer, the Indian legislature had plenary powers of legislation as large 
as those of the English parliament, provided that it did not exceed the 
powers limited by the Indian Charter Act 1813. Indian acts, whether 
original or in the form of re-enacted English acts, became part of the 
law applicable in the Straits Settlements.95 Finally, as a result of the 
Straits Settlements Act 1866,96 the Straits Settlements were separated 
from India and constituted a separate colony with its own legislature in 
the form of the new Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements.97 The 
new Legislative Council passed laws for the good governance of the 
Straits Settlements. Nonetheless, laws passed by the Governor-General 
of India in Council still applied in the Straits Settlements. 
43 This state of affairs in so far as the legislative power was 
concerned remained largely unchanged until the Japanese Occupation 
between 1942 and 1945. After the Japanese surrender, the British 
Military Administration was established on 15 August 1945 by a 
proclamation issued by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East 
Asia.98 Clause 2 of this proclamation purported to give the commander 
                                                          
88 c 155. 
89 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 15. 
90 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 18. 
91 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 19. 
92 c 85. 
93 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 20. 
94 (1878) 3 App Cas 889. 
95 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 21. 
96 c 115. 
97 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 22. 
98 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 26. 
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“full judicial, legislative, executive and administrative powers and 
responsibilities”. The breadth of this statement was doubted by Murray 
Aynsley CJ in Battat v R,99 where he said that “military authority has 
under no circumstances any power of legislation”.100 
44 In any case, the Straits Settlements were disbanded on 1 April 
1946 and Singapore became a separate colony. Under the terms of the 
Singapore Colony Order in Council,101 a Singapore legislative council 
was formed with power to legislate for the peace, order and good 
government of the colony.102 The path to independence for Singapore 
was laid with the Singapore Colony Order in Council 1955 (“1955 
Order”), which replaced the former legislative council with a legislative 
assembly. This 1955 Order was further revoked by the Singapore 
(Constitution) Order in Council 1958,103 which granted Singapore 
internal self-government. Lee Kuan Yew was elected the first Prime 
Minister of Singapore. Throughout the process, the continuity of 
English legislation was preserved. Merger with Malaysia in 1963 
changed the legislative assembly to the Legislature of Singapore but with 
limited powers restricted to the list set out in the Malaysian 
Constitution.104 Finally, Singapore became independent on 9 August 
1965, with its own parliament that has the legislative power as it is 
known today. 
45 Concurrently with the evolution of the legislative power, the 
judicial power also changed. By the time the British arrived in 1819, 
pragmatism overtook any formal adherence to the separation between 
judicial and legislative powers. For example, because the Governor of 
the Straits Settlements had the power to overrule the Recorder’s legal 
judgments, there was a concentration of judicial and executive power in 
the Governor’s hands.105 However, this was to come to pass when a 
Third Charter of Justice was granted on 12 August 1855, creating the 
office of the Second Recorder in Singapore. Thereafter, the Recorder of 
Singapore, who is the predecessor to the Chief Justice of Singapore, 
together with the Governor and the Resident Councillor, had 
jurisdiction over Singapore and Malacca. The separation between the 
                                                          
99 [1950] MLJ 52. 
100 Battat v R [1950] MLJ 52 at 53. 
101 c 54. 
102 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 28. 
103 SI 1958 No 1956. 
104 Geoffrey W Bartholomew, “English Statutes in Singapore Courts” (1991) 3 SAcLJ 1 
at 31. 
105 Kevin Y L Tan, “A Short Legal and Constitutional History of Singapore” in 
The Singapore Legal System (Kevin Y L Tan ed) (Singapore University Press, 
2nd Ed, 1999) at p 34. 
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judicial and legislative powers came to be more clearly distinguished 
later on. 
(3) Division between judicial and legislative powers today 
46 From the brief historical sketch, it may be observed that the 
trump of the legislative power has had a long historical development. 
Indeed, the courts have recognised the historical division between 
legislation and the common law today. Thus, they have occasionally 
maintained that they should not act like “mini-legislatures”. For 
example, in Lim Meng Suang, the Court of Appeal said that “the courts 
are separate and distinct from the Legislature” [emphasis in original].106 
More specifically, the court explained that while the courts do “make” 
law, they do so only in the context of the interpretation of statutes and 
the development of the principles of common law and equity. The court 
further emphasised that it is impermissible for the courts to “arrogate to 
themselves legislative power – to become, in order words, ‘mini-
legislatures’” [emphasis in original].107 It is clear that the Singapore 
courts do, broadly speaking, draw a distinction between their judicial 
power and the legislative power such that they have no legislative power 
and will respect the power of the Legislature “to review its own 
legislation and amend legislation accordingly if it is of the view that this 
is necessary”.108 The key exception, of course, is that Singapore courts 
can strike down statutes that are unconstitutional – something that the 
English courts, without the benefit of a written Constitution, have had 
to resort to “common law constitutionalism” to do should they so 
wish.109 
47 While the Court of Appeal in Lim Meng Suang is undoubtedly 
correct that courts should not be “mini-legislatures”, that can only take 
one so far. Indeed, it is indisputable that courts should not amend 
legislation on their own accord even if they think they know better. It is 
also certainly the case that the courts should not, as the Court of Appeal 
put it in Tan Kiam Peng v Public Prosecutor,110 “distort the relevant 
statutory language”.111 However, in less-than-obvious instances where 
the judicial and legislative powers conflict, the answer may not be so 
clear. It is necessary to discern some basic norms for dealing with 
legislative gaps in Singapore before suggesting a possible framework. 
                                                          
106 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [77]. 
107 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [77]. 
108 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [82]. 
109 Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) at p 43. 
110 [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1. 
111 Tan Kiam Peng v Public Prosecutor [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1 at [25]. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 
492 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2016) 28 SAcLJ 
 
IV. Suggested framework for dealing with legislative gaps in 
Singapore 
A. Basic norms 
(1) Separation between legislative and judicial powers 
48 The first clear norm is that there is a separation between 
legislative and judicial powers. However, this does not mean that the 
legislative power will always trump the judicial power – the exclusive 
domain of each power still needs to be understood.112 Indeed, as the 
Court of Appeal succinctly said in Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General113 
(“Tan Seet Eng”):114 
… though the branches of government are co-equal, this is so only in 
the sense that none is superior to the other while all are subject to the 
Constitution. 
However, each branch has separate and distinct responsibilities.115 It is 
only in that context that the hierarchy of responsibilities can be 
demarcated. 
49 In Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor,116 the High 
Court gave the following definition of “judicial power”:117 
In essence, the judicial function is premised on the existence of a 
controversy either between a State and one or more of its subjects, or 
between two or more subjects of a State. The judicial function entails 
the courts making a finding on the facts as they stand, applying the 
relevant law to those facts and determining the rights and obligations 
of the parties concerned for the purposes of governing their 
relationship for the future. 
This definition is in line with the broader recognition, accepted by the 
Court of Appeal in Tan Seet Eng, that courts and judges are not the 
best equipped to deal with matters that are largely concerned with 
issues of “policy or security or which call for polycentric political 
considerations”.118 How this particular deference had developed 
historically has been discussed. Thus, this definition merely emphasises 
that courts and judges are more concerned with “justice and legality in 
                                                          
112 Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947 at [19]. 
113 [2015] 1 SLR 779. 
114 Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 779 at [90]. 
115 Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 779 at [90]. 
116 [2012] 4 SLR 947. 
117 Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947 at [27]. 
118 Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 779 at [93]. 
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the particular cases that come before them”.119 Indeed, as Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR said in R v Secretary of State for Defence, ex parte Smith:120 
… the greater the policy content of a decision, and the more remote 
the subject matter of a decision from ordinary judicial experience, the 
more hesitant the court must necessarily be in holding a decision to be 
irrational. 
According to Lord Diplock, the exclusive functions of the Judiciary 
include interpreting the written law and declaring the unwritten law.121 
The point is that the legislative and judicial powers are distinct and in 
certain areas, the legislative power will trump the judicial power. 
(2) Legislation can oust existing common law but only if intended 
50 Secondly, flowing from the separate and exclusive domains of 
the legislative and judicial powers, legislation can through written law 
oust existing common law, but only if this is clearly intended.122 An 
example can be seen in Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong,123 
where the Court of Appeal recognised that Art 14(2)(a) of the 
Constitution expressly provides that it is Parliament which has the final 
say on how the balance between constitutional free speech and 
protection of reputation should be struck. Hence, the courts should be 
very slow in developing the common law of defamation in a different 
direction.124 
51 In the absence of clear legislative intention, it should be 
presumed that the common law should be developed concurrently with 
the statutory law. In Goldring Timothy Nicholas v Public Prosecutor,125 
the High Court held as a fundamental presumption of statutory 
interpretation that Parliament would not have removed rights pre-existing 
in common law if there was no express provision or clearly evinced 
intention to that effect.126 This principle is justified by the reality that 
there should be as little gap in the law as possible. As such, Parliament 
should be regarded as being very slow to disturb the existing corpus of 
                                                          
119 Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 779 at [93]. 
120 [1996] QB 517 at 556, cited in Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 779 
at [92]. 
121 Lord Diplock, “Judicial Control of Government” [1979] MLJ cxl at cxlvii, cited in 
Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 779 at [94]. 
122 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [79]. This includes rules of 
equity as well. 
123 [2010] 1 SLR 52. 
124 Review Publishing Co Ltd v Lee Hsien Loong [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [270]. 
125 [2013] 3 SLR 487. 
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common law without saying that it intended to do so and what the 
legislative replacement is. 
52 However, this principle should not be confined to express 
provisions. Indeed, legislative silence as expressed through gaps can 
also, where appropriate, amount to a positive intention to oust the 
common law as well. This is in line with a basic axiom of contractual 
interpretation where silence can be taken to mean positive intention as 
well.127 The practical significance of this is that comprehensive codes 
may be taken to oust the common law even though there is “silence” on 
the specific question concerned. It can be taken that Parliament, 
through the provision of a comprehensive code, and in line with the 
reasoning in Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd, intended to stifle the 
concurrent development of the common law in the same area. However, 
the intention to oust the common law must be clearly ascertained. 
(3) Judicial power requires judges to develop common law 
53 Thirdly, the judicial power requires judges to develop the 
common law, which is their exclusive domain. Thus, judges should not, 
as far as possible, avoid developing the law on vague notions that it is 
too “difficult” or “far-reaching” such that Parliament is the better placed 
to do so. As Burrows put it:128 
… the existence of a statute is rarely a good reason for denying a 
natural development of the common law. Reasoning to that effect has 
seriously tarnished some areas of the law. While factors such as 
impracticability and inconsistency would justify not developing the 
common law, it is misguided to see a statute as reflecting Parliament’s 
intention that the law should be frozen as is. Leading on from that, it is 
an abdication of judicial responsibility for judges, at least in the law of 
obligations, to decline to develop the common law on the grounds that 
legislation is more appropriate. Even if a statutory solution would be 
better, no-one can predict whether legislation will, or will not, be 
passed. It is therefore preferable for judges to proceed as they think fit, 
whether the decision be in favour or against a development, knowing 
that the Legislature is free to impose a statutory solution if the 
common law position is thought unsatisfactory or incomplete. 
54 However, this is not to say that the judicial power extends to 
pronouncing via the common law on all matters. Indeed, as has been 
discussed above, there are matters that are so far-removed from the 
judicial expertise that the judges would be ill-placed to decide or rule on 
                                                          
127 Midlink Development Pte Ltd v The Stansfield Group Pte Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 258 
at [51]–[52]. 
128 Andrew Burrows, “The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the Law 
of Obligations” (2012) 128 LQR 232 at 258. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
  
(2016) 28 SAcLJ Where Judicial and Legislative Powers Conflict 495 
 
them. Precise examples of such matters will not be easy to list. The 
general guidance may be to avoid what Lord Bingham, quoting from 
Lord Reid,129 has referred to as being “[w]here the question involves an 
issue of current social policy on which there is no consensus within 
community”.130 This may also be understood as the non-lawyer’s law, 
which is essentially rules in fields outside of the lawyer’s expertise.131 
(4) Judicial power requires judges to interpret, which may involve 
reading in or subtracting words from legislation 
55 Fourthly, the judicial power requires judges to interpret, and 
this may involve reading in or subtracting words from the legislation 
concerned. Lord Diplock’s otherwise strict test in Wentworth requiring 
the exact alternative words to be known is not consistent with how the 
courts have approached the interpretation of legal documents where 
there has been an obvious mistake. Instead, the modern approach in 
Inco in not insisting on knowing the exact words that Parliament 
intended to include but for the mistake should be preferred. This would 
bring it in line with the approach adopted in the leading case governing 
common law rectification under English law, East v Pantiles (Plant Hire) 
Ltd132 (“East”). Brightman LJ laid down two conditions for correcting an 
obvious clerical mistake by the process of construction as follows:133 
Two conditions must be satisfied: first, there must be a clear mistake 
on the face of the instrument; secondly, it must be clear what 
correction ought to be made in order to cure the mistake. If those 
conditions are satisfied, then the correction is made as a matter of 
construction. 
56 The statement of common law rectification in East has been 
accepted and applied by the Singapore courts. The first instance is the 
High Court case of Ng Swee Hua v Auston International Group Ltd134 
(“Ng Swee Hua”), in which the court used common law rectification to 
amend an investment agreement that misidentified the relevant 
company. In the court’s words:135 
                                                          
129 Lord Reid, “The Judge As Law Maker” (1972–1973) 12 JSPTL (NS) 22 at 23, cited 
in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [178]. 
130 Tom Bingham, “The Judge As Lawmaker: An English Perspective” in The Business 
of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (Oxford University Press, 2000) ch 2, 
at p 31, cited in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [179]. 
131 Tom Bingham, “The Judge As Lawmaker: An English Perspective” in The Business 
of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (Oxford University Press, 2000) ch 2, 
at p 32, cited in Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 at [179]. 
132 [1982] 2 EGLR 111. 
133 East v Pantiles (Plant Hire) Ltd [1982] 2 EGLR 111 at 112. 
134 [2008] SGHC 241. 
135 Ng Swee Hua v Auston International Group Ltd [2008] SGHC 241 at [33]. 
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In the Investment Agreement, the ‘Company’ is identified as AIMT. 
Clause 3.2.5 on its face bears out a clear error of drafting which has led 
to a meaningless clause. A literal reading gives rise to absurdity. It is 
plain from the language used that a mistake was made by the 
draftsman. It is necessary to cure the drafting error to reflect the true 
intention of the draftsman. It is clear what corrections need to be 
made in order to cure the mistake. Reference to ‘Company’ in cl 3.2.5 
should read as Auston. 
57 This approach in correcting for mistake as a matter of 
contractual interpretation should be applied in statutory interpretation. 
While there may be differences between the interpretation of contracts 
and statutes, this is not an occasion calling for a different approach since 
the drafter’s intention is still being given effect to. 
(5) Legislative power dictates judges cannot substitute their own 
intent for legislative intent 
58 Fifthly, the legislative power dictates that the courts must not 
substitute their intention for the legislative intent, where the legislative 
intent is clear. Relevantly, in the High Court decision of Public 
Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng (“Low Kok Heng”),136 V K Rajah JA (as he 
then was) stated that any discussion on the construction of statutes in 
Singapore takes place against the backdrop of that section.137 More 
specifically, Rajah JA in Low Kok Heng also thought that statutory 
provisions should not, in the name of applying the purposive approach, 
be interpreted in a manner that goes against all possible and reasonable 
interpretations of the express actual wording of the provision.138 In 
essence, the court is bound by the text as enacted.139 Perhaps the best 
support for these views was stated by Andrew Phang Boon Leong J 
(as he then was) in Nation Fittings (M) Sdn Bhd v Oystertec plc,140 in 
which the learned judge said that the court’s purposive interpretation 
should be “consistent with, and should not either add to or take away 
from, or stretch unreasonably, the literal language of the statutory 
provision concerned”.141 In other words, the language is the framework 
                                                          
136 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183. 
137 Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [39]. 
138 Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [52]. See also Tan Un 
Tian v Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR(R) 729 at [45] and Comfort Management Pte 
Ltd v Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 SLR(R) 67 at [18], in which the High Court stated 
that if the statutory word is capable of one meaning, the courts should not give it 
an alternative meaning, for to do so would be to perform a legislative function: 
“A line must still be drawn between purposive interpretation and law-making.” 
139 Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [53]. 
140 [2006] 1 SLR(R) 712. 
141 Nation Fittings (M) Sdn Bhd v Oystertec plc [2006] 1 SLR(R) 712 at [27]. 
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within which the legislative purpose must expressly or implicitly 
manifest, failing which the latter cannot be given effect to. 
59 A parallel may also be drawn between this situation and 
contractual interpretation. In YES F&B Group Pte Ltd v Soup Restaurant 
Singapore Pte Ltd142 (“Soup Restaurant”), the Court of Appeal accepted 
the UK Supreme Court’s approach in Arnold v Britton,143 which is that 
the court should ordinarily start from the position that the parties did 
not intend that the term(s) concerned were to produce an absurd result. 
However, this is only a starting point – and no more. The court cannot 
ignore and disregard the intention of the parties (based on the objective 
evidence), thus rewriting the term(s) of the contract for them based on 
the court’s (subjective) view of what is just and fair. This approach aptly 
mirrors what the courts should do in interpreting statutes and 
discerning the legislative intent. 
60 With these five norms in mind, the proposed framework within 
which the courts should resolve both legislative gaps and non-gaps can 
now be considered. 
B. Resolving legislative gaps 
(1) Did Parliament intend the gap? 
61 The first question is whether Parliament intended the legislative 
gap. If Parliament intended the gap to be present, then the courts cannot 
purport to fill in such an intentional gap. Again, a similar approach is 
taken in the implication of contractual terms and it is from there that 
valuable lessons can be drawn in resolving legislative gaps. 
62 In Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd,144 the Court of 
Appeal prescribed a three-step process to guide the implication of terms 
in fact.145 The first step requires the court to ascertain that a gap in the 
contract had arisen because the parties had not contemplated the gap; it 
is only in such a situation that a term can be implied. The court 
identifies as one instance of a false gap where the parties “contemplated 
the issue” but did “not agree on a solution” and hence did not make any 
provision for it.146 This is uncontroversial: were a court to imply a term 
despite finding that the parties had considered but omitted to provide 
                                                          
142 [2015] 5 SLR 1187. 
143 [2015] 2 WLR 1593. 
144 [2013] 4 SLR 193. 
145 Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 193 at [101]. 
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for a given issue, it would certainly be making the contract for the 
parties.147 
63 Similarly, in so far as legislative gaps are concerned, the fact that 
Parliament intended the gap must mean that the courts cannot fill it. 
Intention must be ascertained at the time Parliament passed the statute, 
similar to how contracts are interpreted. This does not mean that the 
meaning of the statute is necessarily fossilised at the time of enactment; 
Parliament can always intend that an “updating” interpretation is to be 
applied. However, in absence of such intention, it is safer for the courts 
to interpret the legislative intent on the basis of what Parliament is taken 
to know at the time of enactment. 
64 This provides guidance on how courts should interpret a statute 
that is “outdated”. It is respectfully submitted that the correct approach 
can be seen in the Court of Appeal’s decision in AAG v Estate of AAH, 
deceased148 (“AAG”). In that case, the court had to interpret ss 2 and 3(1) 
of the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act149 (“IFPA”), which was enacted 
some 45 years ago.150 The appellant sought, on behalf of her two 
illegitimate daughters, maintenance from the estate of the deceased, the 
respondent, under the IFPA. The High Court had dismissed her 
application. On appeal, the sole issue was whether an illegitimate child 
could claim for support under the IFPA. 
65 The relevant provisions were s 3(1) read with s 2 of the IFPA. 
Section 3(1) allows, amongst others, a wife to apply for maintenance for 
certain dependants, including a son and daughter. Section 2 of the  
IFPA defines “son” and “daughter” but does not expressly exclude an 
illegitimate child from claiming maintenance. 
66 Notwithstanding this, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal 
and held that the respondent need not provide any maintenance for the 
appellant’s daughters. It disregarded social developments since the 
enactment of the IFPA and decided that the original legislative intent 
present at the time of enactment was determinative of the correct 
interpretation of the provisions concerned. The court emphasised that 
the IFPA was enacted to introduce into Singapore the provisions of the 
UK Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938.151 The established 
interpretation of the UK legislation by the English courts was that 
illegitimate children were not entitled to maintenance under it. This 
                                                          
147 Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 193 at [95]. 
148 [2010] 1 SLR 769. 
149 Cap 138, 1985 Rev Ed. 
150 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 April 1966) vol 25 at col 78 
(Yong Nyuk Lin). 
151 c 45. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
  
(2016) 28 SAcLJ Where Judicial and Legislative Powers Conflict 499 
 
interpretation was relevant because during the second reading of the 
IFPA in Parliament, the Minister had said that:152 
… [t]he provisions relating to family provision appear to have worked 
well in England and it is proposed to introduce them into Singapore. 
That was legislative intention and the court held that it was obliged to 
give effect to such intention.153 In the end, the court urged Parliament  
to seriously consider making the necessary reforms to enable an 
illegitimate child to claim for maintenance under the IFPA, but did not 
regard the judicial power as being able to trump the legislative power in 
the circumstances. 
67 This approach is further substantiated by the difference between 
interpretative and non-interpretative doctrines.154 Barak states that the 
authority to alter a text is one which belongs to its author, that is, 
Parliament, but not to the Judiciary. The act of interpretation is the 
giving of a legal text a meaning its language (explicitly or implicitly) can 
bear and does not involve the express rewriting of the language.155 
Interpretation ends at the point at which language ends.156 The 
separation of powers restricts interpreters from stretching the meaning 
of statutory provisions.157 
68 While language is open to varying degrees of interpretation,158 
this does not mean that it is infinitely malleable and can take on any 
                                                          
152 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 April 1966) vol 25 at col 78 
(Yong Nyuk Lin). 
153 AAG v Estate of AAH, deceased [2010] 1 SLR 769 at [40]. 
154 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005) 
at pp 14–15. 
155 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005) 
at p 18. 
156 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005) 
at p 15. 
157 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005) 
at p 20. This was also alluded to by V K Rajah JA in Public Prosecutor v Low Kok 
Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [52] when he said: 
Courts must be cautious to observe the limitations on their power and to 
confine themselves to administering the law. ‘Purposive construction often 
requires a sophisticated analysis to determine the legislative purpose and a 
discriminating judgment as to where the boundary of construction ends and 
legislation begins’ (per McHugh JA in Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 
11 NSWLR 404 at 423). Section 9A of the Interpretation Act should not be 
viewed as a means or licence by which judges adopt new roles as legislators; 
the separation of powers between the judicial branch and the legislative 
branch of government must be respected and preserved. 
 See also Edmund W Thomas, “The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: 
A Tentative Thought or Two for the New Millennium” (2000) 31 VUWLR 5. 
158 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005) 
at pp 23–24. 
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meaning. The only question is what the relevant legislative intent was 
and to what extent the court can take into account any “updates” to the 
original legislative intent. In this respect, an “updating interpretation” is 
probably permissible if the updating is simply to include within a wide 
category (for example, a manner of communication) specific modes 
which were not in existence at the time the legislation was introduced.159 
This much was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in AAG.160 The 
language is not stretched because the concern was with the broader 
category generally, not modes of it specifically. However, it is a different 
thing if the “updating” gives rise to the impression of rewriting the 
legislation. 
(2) If not intended, did Parliament intend the statute to be a 
comprehensive code for the subject-matter? 
69 If Parliament did not intend for a specific gap, the related 
question is whether it nonetheless intended for the statute to represent a 
complete code that would displace the concurrent development of the 
common law. For example, in Ritzland Investment Pte Ltd v Grace 
Management & Consultancy Services Pte Ltd,161 the High Court noted 
that the EA is a comprehensive code of evidence, with the implication 
that it could be regarded as having overridden the common law of 
evidence, except that the Act itself provides that it only repealed 
common law rules of evidence inconsistent with it.162 The default 
position thus appears to be that a comprehensive code can preclude the 
concurrent development of the common law. 
(3) If not intended, and Parliament did not intend statute to be 
comprehensive code, Judiciary can fill the gap in limited 
situations 
70 If Parliament did not intend for a specific gap and for the 
statute to be a comprehensive code, then any gap would be inadvertent. 
However, this does not mean that the courts can fill in all gaps because 
there may be no compass for them to do so. The courts cannot 
substitute their view of what is the right result in correcting the 
legislative provision. This explains why any power to do so is confined 
to obvious drafting mistakes and unintelligible provisions. 
                                                          
159 For example, in SM Integrated Transware Pte Ltd v Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd 
[2005] 2 SLR(R) 651 at [78]. 
160 AAG v Estate of AAH, deceased [2010] 1 SLR 769 at [30]. 
161 [2014] 2 SLR 1342. 
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71 Thus, the Court of Appeal in Kok Chong Weng v Wiener Robert 
Lorenz163 (“Kok Chong Weng”) held that a court may exceptionally read 
words into a statute that were not expressly included in it if:164 
(a) it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions 
of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that 
Parliament sought to remedy with the Act; (b) it was apparent that the 
draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so 
omitted to deal with, the eventuality that was required to be dealt with 
so that the purpose of the Act could be achieved; and (c) it was 
possible to state with certainty what the additional words would be 
that the draftsman would have inserted and that Parliament would 
have approved had their attention been drawn to the omission. In Inco 
Europe Ltd at 592, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead framed the third 
requirement in a broader fashion as follows: that the court must be 
abundantly sure of ‘the substance of the provision Parliament would 
have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament 
would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed’. In our view, 
given the broad wording of s 9A of the Interpretation Act, the broader 
formulation of Lord Nicholls is more consonant with the legislative 
purpose of that provision. 
72 However, this is a very limited power that is applied only in very 
clear cases. It may be arguable that s 9A(1), in providing that preference 
be given to an interpretation that promotes the purpose underlying the 
written law, even if such purpose is not expressly stated, might be 
helpful for reading in words in a statute to promote such an unstated 
purpose. However, it is submitted that, in the normal situation, the 
words of the statute constitute the ambit within which the statutory 
purpose can be realised. Indeed, the test in Kok Chong Weng envisages 
not only that the rectifiable error in the statute must be clear (and hence 
not a judicial inference), but also that the court must be certain what 
Parliament would have intended. These are strict conditions that will 
only be satisfied in exceptional cases. However, as discussed above, the 
approach should also not be so strict as to negate all possibility of the 
courts reading a statute in the sense it was intended to be even though 
its text is mistaken. 
C. Resolving legislative non-gaps 
(1) Did Parliament intend to oust the development of common law? 
73 In so far as legislative non-gaps are concerned, the question is 
whether Parliament intended to oust the concurrent development of the 
common law. Unless there is some clear indication of this, the courts 
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should be very slow to find that this is the case. Factors indicative of 
such an intention, short of an express stipulation, may be a comprehensive 
code. 
74 This is in line with the judicial duty to develop the common law. 
Thus, it is respectfully suggested that the fact that Parliament has 
touched on a matter generally does not preclude the courts from 
developing the common law in this regard. Indeed, even if Parliament 
has dealt with a matter specifically, that does not, without more, 
preclude the development of the common law. 
(2) The limited exception 
75 However, this reluctance to find that courts intend to stifle the 
concurrent development of the common law may not be applicable 
where the matter concerns issues removed from the judicial domain. 
This, as discussed above, would include matters involving non-lawyer’s 
law or matters that are the subject of current social debate that is not 
within the courts’ expertise to resolve. 
D. Summary 
76 It will be observed that the respective suggested frameworks for 
resolving legislative gaps and non-gaps are very similar. This resolves 
the problems earlier identified about how the current approaches miss 
the real question and hence risk the adherence to a ritualistic formula 
that could yield inconsistent results. At the heart of the problem of 
legislative gaps and non-gaps is the interplay between legislative and 
judicial powers. It is only through confronting that interplay that a 
principled approach can be arrived at. 
V. Conclusion 
77 This article has sought to deal with the problem of legislative 
gaps and non-gaps. What Aristotle said centuries ago is still a problem 
that has to be confronted by modern courts so long as there is a division 
of power between the different branches of government. The judicial 
pronouncement that courts should not be “mini-legislatures”, while 
undoubtedly correct, is only the start of the analysis. A more nuanced 
approach, from both history and principle, has been advanced in this 
article to deal with legislative gaps and non-gaps. There remains much 
that obviously cannot be covered in the space of one article, but it is 
hoped that the ideas in this article will be useful to further the 
discussion to what is an important issue in Singapore’s system of law. 
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